Review of Australia’s Health Sector Response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009: Lessons Identified

Chapter 6: Health Sector Capacity

Table of contents

Considerable resources are required to sustain a public health emergency response over several months, even during a less severe pandemic.
‘Business as usual’ was generally continued in both the public and clinical healthcare settings.
Public health unit support for border screening, contact tracing, surveillance reporting and quarantine management was resource intensive.
The early strain on hospital system capacity is likely to occur in another pandemic while severity is unknown.
A major limitation to surge capacity in hospital intensive care units was lack of availability of trained intensive care staff with infectious diseases experience.
General practice had a larger role than had been considered in planning.
There is a need to develop guidance on strategies that could be employed during a pandemic to enhance the finite health sector workforce capacity and maintain it for long periods of time.

Text box 6: Health sector capacity guidance from AHMPPI 2008

Objective

Operational objective 3: Optimise the health system to reduce morbidity and mortality.
Purpose
Minimise transmission of the pandemic virus by:
- undertaking initial assessment of suspected cases and isolation of the sick
- ensuring rapid referral of people to ‘flu clinics’
- working with relevant state, territory and local government agencies to facilitate contact tracing and quarantining of exposed individuals
- assisting with antiviral medication and vaccine administration.
Ensure that health services are optimised by:
- maintaining primary care services for patients
- assisting at ‘flu clinics’
- providing home care (if practical) for suspected cases.

Governance

This information is current for 17 May, 2012
This information was issued on October, 2011

Level of Pandemic Threat
ALERT Phase